ANIMALS ARE PEOPLE, TOO

“Then the Lord opened the mouth of the donkey, and it said to Balaam, ‘What have I done to you, that you have struck me these three times?’ . . . The angel of the Lord said to [Balaam], “Why have you struck your donkey these three times?”

                                                        ~ Numbers 22:28, 32

“Animals are people, too.”  I used to say this with some regularly years ago – before I ever dreamed of becoming an animal advocate and when I was blissfully unaware of philosophical controversies over what makes a “person” – because it seemed self-evident to me that animals were unique individuals with their own viewpoints on the world and were therefore “people.”  Fast forward several years to when I was writing my proposal for my master’s thesis at Wesley Seminary. I included some language (I don’t remember what it was) potentially attributing “personhood” to animals.  My advisor warned, “Don’t go there.  You don’t need to, and you’ll only get yourself into trouble.”   

It was good advice, but I am going to “go there” today because I want to talk about justice. 

Dr. Charles Camosy, professor of Christian Ethics at Fordham University, has recently written a book entitled For Love Of Animals, Christian Ethics, Consistent Action.[1]  In it, he argues (among other things) that animals, as sentient creatures, are owed “justice.”

Christopher Tollefsen, professor of Philosophy at the University of South Carolina, however, takes issue with Camosy’s views in a book review at Public Discourse (Part One, Part Two).  I not only think that Tollefsen misunderstands Camosy’s argument, I think he misunderstands animals and those who care about them, as well as the theological underpinnings of concern for animals, and in so doing he displays many of the attitudes that have caused a great deal of suffering in the world.  I think it is important to look at the arguments he makes and why they are both incorrect and harmful.[2]  I apologize for the length of this post (and no pictures!), but I hope you will stick with it.  There is a lot to cover.

Tollefsen takes issue with Camosy’s position that animal welfare is an issue of justice.  Camosy defines “doing justice” as “being consistent and impartial in giving individuals and groups what they are owed.”[3]  Speaking specifically of Christian justice, he adds that Christians are to be particularly concerned about vulnerable individuals and groups in a context that is “skeptical of practices which promote violence, consumerism, and autonomy.”[4]  At the risk of doing violence to Camosy’s position through extreme brevity, Camosy argues that animals, as sentient creatures capable of suffering are vulnerable and are owed treatment that is free of cruelty.  Therefore, animals are a proper subject of justice. 

Tollefsen, however, argues that justice is owed only among creatures who are “equal:”  “Our treatment of human beings [is] determined by the special kind of thing human beings are. Beings which [sic] are not special in the way that we are, who do not have the same nature that we have, cannot be the objects of the same kind of moral concern that human beings are.”[5] What sets humans apart, he contends, is “our rational nature, our nature as beings possessed of a radical capacity for intellection and free choice" (emphasis original). These special attributes, he asserts, set humans apart from all other creatures, make all humans “persons,” equal to all other “persons,” and provides the foundation for “the obligation that other rational beings have to treat humans with fundamental forms of moral respect.”  Justice he asserts, is only owed among these equal “persons,” and is not owed to those who are “fundamentally” not equal with “persons.”[6]

Tollefsen’s argument falls short in a number of ways.  It is incorrect and outdated as to the nature of animals, it disregards suffering as a moral reference point, and it limits the reach of “justice” to the powerful (or at least, those of “equal” power). [7]  There is, of course, a long history of this kind of thinking, as earlier posts make sadly clear; it is a history grounded more firmly in Greek philosophy than in Scripture and it leaves in its trail a great deal of cruelty. 

Tollefsen argues that “the presumption in favor of the human” is grounded on the human capacity of “intellection and free choice,” and that this ability gives to humans “an essential form of dignity.” 

That claim, in turn, finds theological expression in the view that human beings are specially made in the image and likeness of God. And it finds further theological expression in the claims that human beings were (and are) made directly by God, and for God—that we are created to have a special relationship of friendship with our Creator.

This is a classic example of what Richard Middleton means when he says “many interpreters [of “image of God”] turn to extrabiblical, usually philosophical, sources to interpret the image and end up reading contemporaneous conceptions of being human back into the Genesis text.”[8] We should, instead, start with what Scripture has to say and work our way outward. 

As a preliminary matter, Scripture tells us that the animals were also “made directly by God, and for God,” so that clearly cannot be the basis for setting humans above other animals or denying animals “justice.”  

More substantively, I’m not sure exactly what Tollesfsen means by “intellection and free choice.”  If he means the ability to analyze problems, to create and use tools to solve them, to teach the solutions to young, to plan for the future, develop meaningful relationships with others, to grieve when those others are lost, to make personal sacrifices for the benefit of others, to choose between available options, to delay gratification for a greater reward in the future, to intervene to help another who is in trouble, or similar tasks, as my series Ask The Animals addresses (to be resumed next week, but here are parts one and two), he is simply wrong in asserting that humans are unique in having these abilities.  If these abilities are the ground for a claim to dignity (and justice), then animals have that claim as well as humans. 

But perhaps what he means is the ability to reason abstractly, to contemplate the meaning of life or the nature of God, and to make “free choices” between moral rights and wrongs.  If so, I fail to see how this attribute in particular should afford one a greater claim to dignity, or a stronger claim to “justice,” than all of the abilities listed above.[9]   Indeed, it would seem to me to impose on us an obligation of choosing the "moral right" of treating those of lesser power with dignity and "justice."

 The human claim of dignity, he says, finds its theological expression in the idea that humans are made in the image of God. [10]  I would assert instead, as I explained in my post, Image of God: We Cannot Be Human Without The Animals, that Scripture tells us that humans are made in the image of God in order to have the capacity to exercise dominion (the two ideas are in one verse and cannot be separated), that is, to fulfill our obligations to animals; and that finds its theological expression when we show God’s character of mercy and compassion to those who are given into our care – not when we stand on some alleged “rights” as beings with some perceived “special relationship of friendship with our Creator.”  If we have a special relationship with the Creator, it comes with obligations, not rights.  If we claim “friendship” with God, we must care for is His.  As Jesus never tired of explaining to the Pharisees, we are not entitled to claim “rights” before God because of special “status.”    

The image in which we are made is that of God who forsook His status to be born in manager (a place where animals feed), whose arrival was announced first to shepherds (people who care for animals), who began his ministry with “the wild beasts,” and who, for the benefit those of infinity lesser status, died on a cross. 

Tollefsen points out that because Jesus became a man, “humankind has a centrality in the cosmic drama of redemption.” (This seems only fitting since we had a centrality in its fall, as well.  Let's not get too big a head about this, after all.)  This gives humans “specialness” in creation.  Perhaps so, but this “centrality” and “specialness” by definition are features of obligation, not rights.  We are to work toward the redemption of all creation, as Tollefsen himself acknowledges.  We have a job to do, a job that involves recognizing the value of animals to God.[11] 

In Part Two of Tollefsen’s critique, he seeks to address what he believes our obligations to animals are, since (in his view) they are not obligations of justice.  Here, his real concern comes to light:  Tollefsen (like Camosy) is a strong advocate of the pro-life movement.  While Camosy argues that pro-life adherents should embrace issues of animal welfare because of their similarities, Tollefsen believes that linking the two (which he believes requires accepting that animals are equal to humans, something Camosy does not propose) would be harmful to the pro-life position.[12]  Without wading into the pro-life/pro-choice controversy, which is beyond the purview of this blog, I would like to consider what Tollefsen says we do owe animals and why.

But first, I cannot pass by certain strawmen that Tollefsen sets up with regard to animal welfare.[13]  First, he argues that it is not possible to treat all animals with the same “impartiality” with which we are to treat our fellow humans.  Camosy argues only, however, that justice requires us to give the animals “what they are owed,” not equal treatment with humans.  What they are owed depends on how they experience the world, their sentience – so they are owed a life without cruel treatment, at least.[14]  Tollefsen also worries that “the number of beings crying out for positive attention” would be too much too handle.  Even if true, it is not clear to me that is a reason to limit our moral concern.  The number of human tragedies in the world is too much handle, as well.  Whom shall we ignore?

Finally, Tollefsen argues that “[b]ecause resources and time are finite, [treating animals with justice] would certainly come at the expense of some time, money, and attention that is now given to the unborn and to other disadvantaged human beings.”  However, working to end, for example, factory farming is essential for public health, personal health, world hunger, and the health of the planet on which humans live.  Working to end animal fighting is working also for the dignity of humans created in God’s image (see Wilberforce). Working to end testing on animals is working toward faster and more reliable means of toxicity testing on chemicals, a benefit to human health. 

In God’s world order, we are all connected.  We cannot harm ourselves by doing the job we were given at creation.  Yes, resources are scarce; yes, we cannot do it all.  But each of us can do something.  Should we, for example, stop working to end hunger in far flung areas of the world because there are insufficient resources to help children in need in our country?  Of course not.  The idea that we cannot help animals because there are too many human problems is a false dichotomy. It takes nothing whatever away from resources to address human problems to, for example, eat less meat – or give it up altogether -- or buy products not tested on animals, or give the circus a pass.  

So, what does Tollefsen say we owe the animals, since “animals should not be, and indeed cannot be, treated as our equals; any wrongs that are done in respect of them are not, therefore, injustices that are done to them.”  Tollefsen here addresses only factory farming, where he acknowledges “something has gone wrong” (emphasis original).  He does acknowledge that humans should practice kindness toward animals “so as not to be become cruel human beings.”[15]  Beyond that, he suggests that farm animals should be treated in such a way as to reflect the character of the one who is caring for them, as a house reflects the character of one who lives there:  “we do not like to live in filth, ugliness, stink, or decay; to which we should add, in light of undercover videos of pig factories, casual brutality and violence. Our farms should express who we are, and that ought to mean that they express goodness.”  That is about as far as he seems willing to go.  He is clear, however, that this is not about justice and that individuals who purchase meat from factory farms are not necessarily doing anything wrong by supporting systems that do not “express goodness.” 

So, are animals “persons?”  Do they require “justice?”  I am inherently suspicious of any mode of thinking that seeks to protect one's own at the expense of other.  Here, Tollefsen is loath to acknowledge anything is owed to the animals because he fears it would detract from the inherent value of human beings (including the unborn) and the resources necessary to protect them.  As Mathew Scully has pointed out, however, “justice is not a finite commodity, nor are kindness and love.”[16]  Looking through the lens of Christ, who “did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped” (Philippians 2:6), I cannot say that animals are not sufficiently important to be recognized as creatures with their own inherent value. I cannot say that their suffering is not worth my notice.  I continue to believe and to argue that human value is greatest when we recognize the value of our fellow creatures, and we live most fully into the image of God when offer them love, mercy, compassion, and yes, justice.

Animals are each unique individuals with their own perspective on the world and their own personalities.  For me, that’s enough to call them “people” – someone, not something, as Farm Sanctuary says.  Animals suffer horrifically through no fault of their own at human hands, for me, that’s enough to call injustice and to say that animals are owed better.  Whether I have used these words properly to fit into neat philosophical categories, I cannot say.  Whether we call animals “persons” and whether we call what they are owed “justice,” however, is not important.  What is important is that we recognize their inherent value, their right to live life without needless suffering at human hands, and the obligation of each and every one of us to do something toward that end.

For me the question is not, what does my dignity as a human being demand that I should receive, but rather, what does the grace that I have received require that I should give? 

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[1] It is a very good and accessible introduction to the issue of why Christians, particularly Catholics, should care about animal welfare and I commend it to your attention.

[2] Camosy has responded to Tollefsen’s arguments at Catholic Moral Theology.  I am entirely sure Camosy would not agree with all of my arguments here, and would surely think I have gone too far, but “go there,” I must.

[3] Camosy, p. 2.

[4] Camosy, p. 7.

[5] Why not, I wonder.  What has “specialness” to do with moral worth or fair treatment? Special to whom?

[6] Again, why? 

[7] I suspect Tollefsen would say that he limits the reach of justice to those of equal “dignity,” not power; but he limits it to human beings, and human beings have all the power.  Therefore, he limits justice to the powerful.  We become judge, jury, and executioner in a system that owes the prisoner no justice.

[8] Middleton, J. Richard.  The Liberating Image: Imago Dei in Genesis 1 (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2005), p. 17.  See also, Hall, Douglas John. Imaging God: Dominion As Stewardship. Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 1986, p. 20, arguing that most traditional interpretations of imago Dei are derived not from the context of Scripture but from Greek and Roman philosophy, subsequently modified by various philosophical and moral developments in European history. These are both discussed in my post, Why Has The Church Traditionally Taken A Different View?

[9] I would add that humans have been proven wrong is so many assumptions about animals that I would hesitate to state categorically that all animals lack the capacity to think about such things – how would we know if they did?  See also, Marc Bekoff’s discussion of animal “morality,” in his book The Emotional Lives of Animals: A Leading Scientist Explores Animal Joy, Sorrow, and Empathy – and Why They Matter (Novato: New World Library, 2007). I will touch on this in my next post.  

[10] Since animals also have the ability to think and analyze and make choices, assuming this is what Tollefsen means by “intellection and free choice,” this cannot be what it means to be created in the image of God, since, according to Scripture, that is a uniquely human attribute. 

[11] See my post On Image andValue.

[12] In brief, he argues that because “some human beings” (early fetuses) cannot feel pain, linking obligations for justice to the ability to feel pain is “deadly to the pro-life movement.”

[13] As an initial aside, I note that Tollefsen refers only to “animal liberation.”  I wonder whether he is aware of the different perspectives among those who use the language of “animal liberation,” “animal rights,” and “animal welfare.”   

[14] Tollefsen argues that if we treat animals with the impartiality with which we are to treat humans, we would stop driving cars and cutting down trees.  I would point out that we need to take a hard look at these and other activities for the benefit of humans, as well, as we are rapidly using up the earth’s resources to the detriment not only to ourselves, but to vulnerable human populations around the world and future generations. 

[15] This suggests, of course, that the cruelty to the animal, as such, is of no moral relevance. 

[16] Scully, Matthew. Dominion: The Power of Man, The Suffering of Animals, and The Call to Mercy. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2002.